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DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
for, such payment being accepted. 16 Thus, the traditional exception
to the Statute of Frauds now applies only to the portion concerned,
and in non-severable contracts, it does not apply at all. So, in a non-
severable contract, i.e., one involving a single object, when less than
the full payment is made, the code will not enforce the contract. 1 7
Where A makes a down payment of $300.00 on the purchase of a
refrigerator costing $500.00, the contract for sale will not be removed
from the bar of the Statute of Frauds and, therefore, will not be en-
forceable.
TAXATION - Income vs. Gift - Payments to Widow of Officer-Stock-
holder - Payments made to a widow by a corporation of which her
deceased husband had been an officer, director and shareholder are
not gifts unless they proceed out of generosity, affection, respect,
admiration, charity or like impulses.
Smith v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 305 F.2d 778 (3d
Cir. 1962).
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined deficiencies in
the taxpayer's income tax of $27,000 for 1955 and $22,000 for 1956.
In issue was the proper tax treatment under the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code of certain payments made to the taxpayer, widow of a
corporation's deceased officer and director. The Tax Court concluded
that the payments constituted ordinary income and upheld a defi-
ciency against the taxpayer.
Taxpayer's husband had been a director and officer of J. Wiss and
Sons, Inc., manufacturers of scissors, shears and kindred products.
His salary and bonus totaled $30,000 in each of the three years pre-
ceding his death. Eight days after his death, the board of directors
(all of whom were related to decedent) unanimously adopted a reso-
lution to pay, in recognition of decedent's valuable and loyal services,
to his widow, his unearned salary for the remainder of the year,
$33,000 a year for the next two years, and $5,000 as a death benefit
allowable under the provision of Sec. 101 (b) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954. In adopting the resolution the Board had in mind the
fact that the decedent's death resulted in a curtailment of income
16. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, Comment 2, § 2-201, p. 51; PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12A, Pennsylvania Bar Association Notes, p. 85.
17. Williamson v. Martz, 11 Pa. D. & C. 2d 33, 35, 29 Northumb. L.J. 32, 34
(Pa. Com. P1. 1956).
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to the widow although no specific needs of the widow were discussed
and no consideration was given to her income from other sources.
The widow-taxpayer had never been an officer, director or employee;
had never rendered any services to the corporation; and had never
been carried on the corporation's payroll. J. Wiss and Sons, Inc.,
owed her nothing. The payments to the widow were deducted by the
corporation as general expenses, but she did not include the payments
received in gross income on her individual tax return. A notation
that "a non-taxable gift was received" from J. Wiss and Sons Co.
appeared on the face of each return. In the past, no payments to
widows or survivors of deceased officers of this company had ever
occurred, although occasional payments had been made to widows of
non-officer employees.
Notwithstanding the taxpayer's contention that the payments re-
ceived were "gifts," the Tax Court found it difficult to believe that
the payments were based on the taxpayer's needs or that they pro-
ceeded from a "detached and disinterested generosity . . . out of
affection, respect, admiration, charity, or like impulses."1 The Tax
Court held that ". . . the dominant motive behind these payments
was to give tangible recognition (by the way of additional compen-
sation) to the highly valuable services rendered by the decedent over
a long period of time," and, therefore, the payments were not gifts.2
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, saying:
In summary, determination of whether a transfer consti-
tutes a gift is a factual one, which must be made on a case-
by-case approach, resting with the trier of fact which is to
make it in light of all the relevant facts and circumstances.
• .. [S]uch a determination must be affirmed unless it is
clearly erroneous. 3
Thus, the Third Circuit has become the first appellate court, since
the Supreme Court's most recent gift v. income decision (Duber-
stein), which has upheld the Tax Court's unvarying position that
payments to widows of deceased employees constitute taxable income
rather than non-taxable gifts.
Three other Circuit Courts had previously decided, in cases having
similar factual situations, that the transactions were gifts and there-
fore non-taxable. Such payments were determined to be non-taxable
1. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285, 60-2 U.S. Tax Cas. IT 9515
(1960), quoting Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246; 56-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
9607 (1956) and Robertson v. U. S., 343 U.S. 711, 714; 52-1 U.S. Tax Cas. IT 9343
(1952).
2. 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 775, 779 (1961).
3. 305 F.2d 778, 780, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. IT 9574 (1960).
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gifts in Kuntz' Estate v. Commissioner,4 Olsen's Estate v. Commis-
sioner,5 United States v. Frankel,6 and United States v. Kasynski.
7
Also, the Fourth Circuit has remanded Poyner v. Commissioner8 to
the Tax Court for additional findings of fact after holding that the
Tax Court had erroneously interpreted the Supreme Court in Duber-
stein. At present there are about 50 similar cases pending in various
Federal courts and the Internal Revenue Service has withheld action
on more than 450 others awaiting ultimate disposition of the test
cases. In total, these cases involve approximately five million dollars
of taxes.
Since 19509 the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has sought to
treat corporate payments to widows of deceased employees as ordi-
nary income to the widow under section 61 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954,10 or section 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1939. The widows have contended on the other hand, that the pay-
ments were gifts under section 102 of the 1954 Code, 1 ' or section
22(b) (3) of the 1939 Code, and therefore, not includible in gross
income. This basic controversy continues to rage over the distinction
between the broad definition of income and the limited exclusion
provided for gifts. Until recently, the controversy also extended to
the exclusion provision for certain death benefits. 1 2 Even wary
4. 300 F.2d 849, 62-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9376 (6th Cir. 1962), reversing 19 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 1379.
5. 302 F.2d 671, 62-1 U.S. Tax Cas. gf 9452 (8th Cir. 1962).
6. 302 F.2d 666, 62-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9453 (8th Cir. 1962).
7. 284 F.2d 143, 60-2 U.S. Tax Cas. J 9792 (10th Cir. 1960).
8. 301 F.2d 287, 62-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9387 (4th Cir. 1962).
9. I.T. 4027, 1950-2 Cum. Bull. 9. Prior releases T. D. 2090, 16 Treas. Dec. Int.
Rev. 259, at 267 (1914); 0. D. 1017, 5 Cum. Bull. 101 (1921) and I.T. 3329, 1939-2
Cum. Bull. 153 (1939) treated employer death benefit payments as nontaxable to
the widow, although deductible to the corporation as business expenses.
10. Section 61. Gross Income Defined.
(a) GENERAL DEFINITION-[G]ross income means all income from whatever
source derived ....
11. Section 102. Gifts and Inheritances.
(a) GENERAL RULE -Gross income does not include the value of property ac-
quired by gift ....
12. Section 101(b). Employees' Death Benefits.
(1) GENERAL RULE -Gross income does not include amounts received (whether
in a single sum or otherwise) by the beneficiaries or the estate of an employee,
if such amounts are paid by or on behalf of an employer and are paid by reason of
the death of the employee.
(2) SPECIAL RULES FOR PARAGRAPH (1).
(A) $5,000 LIMITATION - The aggregate amounts excludable under paragraph
(1) with respect to the death of any employee shall not exceed $5,000.
On March 19, 1962, the Service announced (TIR-371; Rev. Rul. 62-102, I.R.B.
1962-28, 7) that It will no longer contend that section 101(b) applies to limit to
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widows may be caught in the labyrinth in spite of a corporation's
avowed purpose to fulfill the requirements of a statutory "gift."
The philosophy of early decisions reflected the common law concept
of gifts (voluntary, donative transfer of dominion and control over
property without actual receipt or expectation of consideration). 13
However, common law concepts do not seem to determine the exist-
ence of a gift for tax purposes since the mere absence of a legal or
moral obligation to make the transfer, which is sufficient to create
a common law gift, does not establish that such a payment is a gift
for tax purposes. 1 4 An abundance of court decisions has failed to
articulate standards for use in distinguishing "gift," other than
they all agreed that "intent" was a determinative element.
In 1960 the Commissioner, in non-widow cases,' 5 sought to establish
a test for the determination of gifts in terms of "motive" rather than
"intention." He attempted to define a gift as a transfer of property
motivated by personal, as distinguished from business reasons. In
Commissioner v. Duberstein and Stanton v. United States,1 6 the
$5,000 the exclusion from gross income of an amount paid to the widow of a de-
ceased employee, where the payment otherwise qualified as a gift excludable under
section 102 (a). However, the Service stressed that it would continue to argue that
in extending section 101 (b) to noncontractual payments, Congress assumed and
Implied that such payments did not qualify as gifts, thereby endorsing their
contention that widows' payments generally are not gifts.
13. Noel v. Parrott, 15 F.2d 669, 1 U.S. Tax Cas. T 184 (4th Cir. 1926), "A
gift is a voluntary transfer of his property by one to another without any consid-
eration or compensation therefor."
14. Commissioner v. Duberstein, supra note 1,"... [T]he statute does not use
the term 'gift' in the common-law sense, but in a more colloquial sense . . . [A]
voluntary executed transfer of his property by one to another, without any con-
sideration or compensation therefore, though a common-law gift, is not necessarily
a 'gift' within the meaning of the statute;" Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S.
34, 45, 37-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9534 (1937), "What controls is not the presence or
absence of consideration. What controls is the intention with which payment,
however voluntary, has been made" (dissenting opinion); Old Colony Trust Co. v.
Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716, 1 U.S. Tax Cas. 408 (1929), "The payment ....
even though entirely voluntary, was nevertheless compensation..."
15. The Internal Revenue Service has christened the cases involving widows
as "widow bonus cases."
16. Supra note 1. Both cases, tried together, involved payments relating to
past services performed by the recipient for the payor. In that the payments were
not voluntarily made to a third person who has done nothing for the payor, the
unique characteristic of the widow cases was missing. The Duberstein case in-
volved the transfer of a Cadillac to a taxpayer by a business friend for furnish-
ing names of potential customers; the Stanton case involved the payment of a
"gratuity" by a real estate operating corporation of a church to a retiring
officer.
1963]
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Supreme Court rejected the Government's invitation to formulate
such a new test and stated:
We are of opinion that the governing principles are neces-
sarily general and have already been spelled out . . . and,
that the problem is one which, under the present statutory
framework, does not lend itself to any more definite state-
ment that would produce a talisman for the solution of
concrete cases.
In effect, the Court rejected the Commissioner's concept that gifts
and business expenses are necessarily inconsistent and instead re-
affirmed its adherence to existing law by concluding that ". , . the
proper criterion, established by decision here, is one that inquires
what the basic reason for his conduct was in fact-the dominant
reason that explains his action in making the transfer." 1 7 These
cases did not create new law; 1 8 they merely summarized certain
governing principles in determining intention.
The decisive factor is the transferor's intention-the basic reason
for the conduct and the dominant reason which explains his action in
making the transfer. 1 9 The nebulosity of "intent" does not permit
a litmus paper test to be developed. Proof of gift intent, or motiva-
tion, "must be based ultimately on the application of the fact-finding
tribunal's experience with the mainsprings of human conduct to the
totality of the facts of each case."' 2 0 Although the courts have not
been in agreement as to the degree of importance to be placed on
each factor, the following manifestations have been of considerable
importance in defining a statutory "gift":
1. The widow, and not the deceased husband's estate, was
the actual recipient of the payments. 2 1
17. Commissioner v. Duberstein, supra note 1, at 286.
18. Poyner v. Commissioner, supra note 8, at 292. "The Supreme Court in
Duberstein did not destroy the authority of the earlier Tax Court cases and the
guides enunciated in them for discovering motivation;" United States v. Frankel,
supra note 6; Hein v. United States ......... F. Supp .......... 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. fi 9564
(E.D. Wis. 1962) (one of two district courts ruling against gift to date).
19. Bogardus v. Commissioner, supra note 14; Commissioner v. Duberstein,
supra note 1.
20. Commissioner v. Duberstein, supra note 1, at 289. Since intention to
make a gift is a question of fact, summary judgments generally will not be
granted to the taxpayer. See, Packard v. United States, 179 F. Supp. 508, 60-1
U.S. Tax Cas. J 9179 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Peters v. Smith, 221 F.2d 721, 55-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. f 9346 (3rd Cir. 1956), reversing 123 F. Supp. 711 (E.D. Pa. 1954). But
see Nixon v. United States, 57-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9982 (E.D. Tenn. 1957), gov't.
appeal dismissed pursuant to stipulation June 23, 1958, 6th Cir.
21. Alice Macfarlane, 19 T.C. 9(1952); Ruth Hahn, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 308
(1954). The Revenue Service has argued that where the payments are to the
[Vol. 1 : p. 248
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2. The widow was neither employed by nor rendered serv-
ices for the transferor-corporation, 2 2 and the corpora-
tion neither received nor expected benefits from the
payments.2 3
3. The transferor-corporation had no enforceable obliga-
tion to the decedent or transferee (widow). Where the
payments have been made under legal or statutory
obligations,2 4 they are generally held taxable but sub-
ject to the $5,000 death benefit exclusion of section
101 (b) of the 1954 Code. The deceased must have been
fully and adequately compensated for all past services 2 5
and no plan, policy, pattern or office-custom can be es-
tablished.2 6 Such a plan or policy may be construed as
creating a moral obligation.
4. The corporation had not formally and substantially
characterized and treated the payment as compensation.
While the failure to submit to the shareholders a reso-
lution authorizing payment has not generally been
argued by the Commissioner, 2 7 a problem may lie in
the fact that corporations generally cannot give away
estate, they constitute compensation to the deceased. Although payments to the
estate have been treated as gifts (Estate of Foote, 28 T.C. 547, 1957), they are
usually taxable to the recipient as income in respect of a decedent under section
691. Estate of O'Daniel, 173 F.2d 966, 49-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9235 (1949), unenforce-
able bonus was income in respect of a decedent although the decedent had no
legal right to enforce the payment; Estate of Bausch, 14 T.C. 1433, afJ'd. 186 F.2d
313 (2d Cir. 1951). It should also be noted that sections 2039(c) (annuities) and
2042 (proceeds of life insurance) of the 1954 Code give preferential treatment
to direct payments.
22. Kuntz' Estate v. Commissioner, supra note 4; Luntz v. Commissioner, 29
T.C. 647 (1958).
23. Estate of Reardon, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 577, 579 (1955) "The payment
appears to have been an act of 'spontaneous generosity' for which the payor
neither received nor anticipated any benefit of any kind."
24. Fisher v. U.S., 129 F.Supp. 759 (D. Mass. 1955) [legal]; Varnedoe v.
Allen, 158 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1946), cert. denied 330 U.S. 821 (1947) [statutory];
Riley v. U. S., 156 F. Supp, 751 (Ct. Cl. 1957) [statutory].
25. Estate of Ginsberg v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1959); Olsen's
Estate v. Commissioner, supra note 5, at 674. "We are not aware that a corpora-
tion has any moral duty to make any payment to a widow of a deceased officer...
who, while he lived, was fully compensated for his services."
26. Packard v. U. S., supra note 20; Simpson v. U. S., 261 F.2d 497 (7th Cir.
1958), cert. denied 359 U.S. 944 (1959) ; Hein v. U. S., supra note 18 (held compen-
sation where a director testified that a prior payment "more or less set a pattern").
27. But see Ruth Hahn v. Commissioner, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 308, 310
(1954). " . . . [T]he fact that the Board of Directors did not obtain shareholder
approval for its payment to petitioner . . . [is] a consideration of lesser im-
portance.... "
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corporate assets without shareholder approval. 28 The
wording of the corporate resolution, 2 9 the treatment of
the payments on the books and tax returns of the cor-
poration, 30 and whether or not the payment has been
considered by a Salary and Compensation Committee, 3 1
are generally of some importance. The timing of the
Board of Directors' Resolution has also been examined
in recent cases.3 2 Other indications of a donative mo-
tive can be gleaned from the absence of Form 1099
(Annual Information Return of Income Payments), the
absence of withholding or payroll deductions 3 3 or the
presence of a state gift tax return. 3 4
28. Moore v. Keystone Macaroni Co., 370 Pa. 172, 87 A.2d 295 (1952). "The
fact that a federal tax law may permit a deduction for tax purposes is entirely
irrelevant to the question of whether a corporation has the right and the power
under the law of Pennsylvania to give away assets." (This case held that a Penn-
sylvania business corporation has no power to pay money voluntarily to the widow
of a deceased president in recognition of his services.)
29. Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 44 (1939); Ruth Hahn v. Commis-
sioner, supra note 27; Estate of Hellstrom, 24 T.C. 916 (1955), where the use of
"salary" in making payments was considered merely a measuring device and not
determinative or considered in concluding whether the payment was a gift. But
see, Bausch's Estate v. Commissioner, 186 F.2d 313, 51-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9146
(2d Cir. 1951); Fischer v. Commissioner, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 318 (1961) and
Poyner v. Commissioner, supra note 8.
30. Alice Macfarlane, supra note 21 (accounted for as salary on the corporate
books); Ruth Hahn, supra note 21 (salary); Friedlander v. U. S., 58-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. U 9182 (E.D. Wis. 1958), where some recognition was given to the question
of intent (current expenses); Pixton v. U. S., 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9686 (S.D. Ala.
1962) (salary disallowed). But see Simpson v. U. S., supra note 26. The corpora-
tion has been allowed a deduction under section 162 (ordinary and necessary busi-
ness expense) even though the payments may have been tax free gifts, in Fifth
Avenue Coach Lines, Inc., 31 T.C. 1080, reifd. on other issue, 281 F.2d 556 (2d Cir.
1960) (1939 Code); Fort Orange Paper Co., 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 917 (1960)
(1954 Code). However, especial attention should now be given to section 4 (a) of
the Revenue Act of 1962 (adding new Code section 274 (b)) which denies a deduc-
tion for gifts that are in excess of $25 per year to any individual. Thus a payment
to a widow of a deceased company officer, which is excludable from her income
as a gift under section 102, would be deductible by the payor only to the extent of
$25, however, if the payment is a death benefit under section 101(b) this limita-
tion of $25 does not apply to it.
31. Schwarz v. U. S., 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. U 9661 (N.D. Tex. 1962).
32. Kuntz' Estate v. Commissioner, supra note 4 (4 days after death) ; U. S. v.
Frankel, supra note 6 (21 days); Fischer, supra note 29 (20 years before death);
Kasynski, supra note 7 (3 years after death).
33. Martin v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 290, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. f 9575 (3rd Cir.
1962), affirming 36 T.C. 56 (1961) (This case was identically decided by the
Third Circuit on the same day as the Smith case by the same jurist.)
34. Marie Haskell v. Commissioner, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 788 (1955) (corpora-
tion paid gift taxes to Virginia); Friedlander v. U. S., supra note 30 (corporation
[Vol. 1 : p. 248
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5. A lack of correlation between the decedent's salary or
stock-ownership and the payment tends to characterize
the payment as a gift. The amount of the payments
should not be based on the amount of decedent's salary,
since payment of the remainder of the year's salary to
the widow unnecessarily colors the "gift" as compen-
sation.35 A large stock-ownership, particularly in a
closely held family corporation, is indicative of a divi-
dend and not a gift.3 6
6. The amount of the payment has generally not troubled
the Courts in determining whether a gift has been
paid.3 7 However, in the case under discussion, the
Commissioner argued that a conclusion of compensation
"is inescapable in view of the amount of the pay-
ments . ... ",38
7. The widow's need and financial resources have assumed
importance in recent years. In the case presently under
consideration, the Commissioner argued that "the fail-
ure of the directors to take into account taxpayer's
considerable financial resources . . . negates her con-
tention that the dominant reason for the payments was
the board's concern for her diminished income .... ",39
This argument is of questionable merit. Although the
needs of a widow may be one of several motivating
and individual both filed a state gift tax return). Note that only individuals are
required to file Federal Gift Tax Return under section 2501 of the 1954 Code.
35. The use of the word "salary" in making payments is merely a measuring
device: Estate of Hellstrom, 24 T.C. 916 (1955); Ruth Hahn, supra note 27; But
see, Simpson v. U. S., supra note 26; and Bausch's Estate, supra note 29 (held
income).
36. Lengsfield v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 508, 57-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9437 (5th
Cir. 1957), affirming 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1024 (1955) (held dividend); Lincoln
National Bank v. Burnett, 63 F.2d 131, 3 U.S. Tax Cas. f 1030 (1933) (dividend
disguised as a gift in non-widow situation); Marie Haskell, supra note 34 (held
not significant where widow and daughter together owned controlling interest);
Louise Aprill, 13 T.C. 707 (1949), (held a gift although deceased's 80% ownership
passed to widow).
37. Olsen's Estate v. Commissioner, supra note 5 (payment held gift); Gaug-
ler v. U. S., 204 F. Supp. 493, 62-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9439 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) ($73,000
payment held income in one of only two district court decisions that have held
payments to represent income).
38. Smith v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 778, (3rd Cir. 1962), Brief for the Re-
spondent, Summary of Argument, p. 17.
39. Ibid.
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factors, 40 it does not follow that corporate gifts can
be made only to the needy.4 1
8. The courts have given great weight to the direct testi-
mony of directors as to the intended purpose at the
time of the passage of the resolution. 4 2
Most cases since 1960 have used the words which Mr. Justice
Brennen used in defining a gift. "A gift in the statutory sense ...
proceeds from a 'detached and disinterested generosity,' 4 3 'out of
affection, respect, admiration, charity or like impulses.''44 Tautolo-
gical use of this mere shibboleth, although linquistically correct, is
of less importance in the present case than Judge Staley's comment
to the effect that:
In summary, determination of whether a transfer consti-
tutes a gift is a factual one, which must be made on a case-
by-case approach, resting with the trier of fact which is to
make it in light of all the relevant facts and circumstances.
. .. (S) uch a determination must be affirmed unless it is
clearly erroneous.
The Tax Court had decided the Smith case in its typical post-1960,
post-Duberstein, fashion. 4 5 As the trier of facts, it methodically
reviewed each individual fact, then decided the case according to
Procrustean standards rather than assaying the qualitative prop-
erties of all the facts. Judge Raum acknowledged that the evidence
was stronger in favor of the widow than in prior Tax Court cases,
but, nevertheless, conformably decided that the payments were not
40. Alice Macfarlane, supra note 21 (held a gift where the financial circum-
stances of decedent's widow were investigated and found not financially secure);
Fischer, upra note 29, at 321 (held compensation where the "... payments were
neither motivated nor measured by the needs of the widow. ) Hein v. U. S.,
supra note 18 (held compensation where directors did not consider the needs of
the widow); Poyner v. Commissioner, supra note 8 (vacating and remanding to
Tax Court, where widow's personal financial status had not been determined).
41. Rice v. U. S., 197 F. Supp. 223, 227; 61-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9658 (E.D. Wis.
1961) (held gift although widow was not in financial need or distress).
42. Kuntz' Estate v. Commissioner, supra note 4 (uncontradicted testimony
of two directors that a gift was intended); Hein v. U. S., supra note 18 (held com-
pensation where four directors testified that payment was "sort of a continuation"
or "severance payment").
43. Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246, 56-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9607
(1956).
44. Robertson v. U. S., 343 U.S. 711, 714, 52-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9343 (1952).
45. Since 1960, the Tax Court has held every case involving payments to
widows to be income, whereas the District Courts, with two exceptions, have held
such payments to be gifts.
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gifts, assigning as the sole reason therefor the widow's absence of
need. The crux of his opinion states that ".... we find it difficult to
believe.., that the payments to petitioner (widow) were based upon
her needs .. .," thereby ignoring the fact that, in adopting the resolu-
tion to make the payments to the widow "The Board had in mind...
the fact that the decedent's death resulted in a curtailment of income
theretofore available to the widow." It is submitted that a corporate
gift can be made to others than the needy or destitute and that the
Tax Court relied on a non-significant fact and circumstance in ar-
riving at its doctrinaire conclusion. Why does the Tax Court refuse
to use previously established tests in post-Duberstein cases if, as the
Third Circuit said in its decision, the Supreme Court "refused the
Commissioner's invitation to spell out a new test for resolving the
question of gift versus income ?"
The Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have held such payments to
be non-taxable gifts, the Fourth Circuit has held that the Tax Court
erroneously interpreted Duberstein, and the Third Circuit now holds
the fact-finders determination to be controlling. With this diversity
of opinions among the various Circuits, the Supreme Court had the
opportunity to resolve the conflicts. At the session of November 13,
1962, the Supreme Court denied, over the objection of Chief Justice
Warren, five writs of certiorari, including the case under discussion.4 
6
When is a gift a "gift"? Undoubtedly there is an answer.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Narcotics - Criminal conviction for the
status of drug addiction is a cruel and unusual punishment.
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S. Ct. 1417 (1962).
Lawrence Robinson was arrested on a Los Angeles street after dis-
coloration and scar tissue were discovered on the inside of his arms.
Two police officers of long experience in the criminal narcotics prob-
lem made the arrest, and they both testified that Robinson admitted
occasional use of narcotics. One of the officers testified that in his
opinion the scars and marks were caused by narcotic injections.' He
46. Cert. denied in Kuntz's Estate v. Commissioner, supra note 4; Olsen's
Estate v. Commissioner, supra note 5; United States v. Frankel, supra note 6;
Martin v. Commissioner, supra note 33; Smith v. Commissioner, supra note 3. 31
U. S. L. Week 3165.
1. "There are few pathognomic physical characteristics by which the opiate
addict can be recognized as such. Scars and abscesses which result from intra-
venous injections of opiates are among the few helpful overt diagnostic character-
19631
